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Income Distribution and Optimal Growth: 
The Case of Open Unemployment* 
INTRODUCTION 
Normative questions relating to income equity have long dominated any 
discussion of income distribution~ Of late, however, economists have focussed 
considerable attention on the relationship of incoL, dispersion to general 
efficiency of resource allocation, e.g., [6], [11), and [15]. Two main 
issues have been raised. The first is the factor opportunity cost effect. 
It is contended that altering income dispersion in a specific direction will 
increase the output share of commodities with low factor opportunity costs. 
The demand for goods which are intense in the relatively abundant factors will 
rise and the demand for goods which are intense in the relatively scarce factors 
will decrease. The second issue concerns the belief that income distribution 
affects import demands. To the extent that a change in income dispersion will 
reduce aggregate import demand, the scarcity value of a limited supply of for• 
eign exchange will be decreased. 1 
In addition to these t~-Jo effects, there is the argument that a more 
even distribution of income causes a decline in the aggregate savings rate 
and thereby retards growth. This link between income distribution and economic 
growth is more controversial than the others. It depends entirely on a change 
in the demand for capital goods, whereas the foreign-exchange and factor­
opportunity•cost effects include this and other changes in demand composition. 
*We would like to thank Professors Kenneth J. Arrow and Richard A. 
Brecher for invaluable comments and criticism. 
1For empirical evidence on these two effects in Latin American 
countries, see Cline [6]. 
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The association of income distribution with the rate of capit.sl formation is 
based on the assumption that the household marginal propensity to save varies 
with either the level or kind of income earned. These are points of considerable 
empirical and theoretical disagreement, as indicated in [7], [G], and [9]. 
Moreover, even if the marginal propensity to save did vary in the hypothesized 
manner, a reduction in private savings due to income equalization could be 
offset by increases in tax revenues and public savings. Under these conditions, 
a reduced dispersion of income will cause the socic1l cost of savirigs to increase 
only if (a) government and private consumption are imperfect substitutes in 
their contribution to social welfare and (b) a chanze in the public-private 
consumption brec1kdmm is necessary to keep c1ggrec;.:!te savings constant. 
For these re2sons, the purpose of this paper is confined to analyzing 
the factor opportunity cost [Ind foreign exchange effects of income distribution. 
The possibility of income distribution influencing the soci2l cost of savings 
is examined in a companion paper [ 16]. The model ,·,e present attempts to fill 
a significant vacuum in th2 existing literature on the relationship of income 
distribution to econo~ic 3rowth, which includes [10]. [17], and [2~. This 
literature genernlly involves closed economy models '1-Jbich assume full employ• 
ment1 Further, it is the distribution of income by !~ind (e.g., relative factor 
shares), rather than level, which affects output composition and capital 
formation in these models. Our model, built upon a foundation of conventional 
theory, represents a si3nificant departure from growth literature in these 
areas, The closed econor,1y assumption is abandoned, and the static relationships 
are derived ns a simple extension of the type of neoclassical trade model 
described by Kemp [12]. The analysis is undertaken in the context of labor 
surplus economies where redistribution appears to be a particularly crucial 
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policy objective. Open unemployment is produced in the system by assuming that 
there is an institutionally-determined floor on the minimum real wage. With 
this constraint binding, investigation is made of the output and employment 
effects of changes in the composition of demand. These changes are induced by 
varying the dispersion of household expenditure. 
These are static considerations. Dynamic elements are introduced into 
the model by equations determining capital accumula, :m and the change in 
capital dispersion over time. Our thesis is that the time paths of the capital 
distribution is more effectively controlled through income taxation than it is 
through other policies affecting factor payments such as import tariffs. 
Therefore, the coefficients of the household tax function make up the policy 
instruments in the model. 
The optimal gro,-,th problem consists of maximizin6 an integral of in­
staneous welfare subject to two dynamic equations snd initial and terminal con­
ditions on the capital-11:,bor ratio and the distribution of capital. We assume 
that the main basis for differences income among households is differences 
in the amount of capital m-med. For this reason, commodity demands are im• 
plicit functions of capital dispersion, and the problem is designed to provide 
direct insight into the optimal trajectory of the standard deviation of the dis­
tribution of capital. Once this trajectory has been determined, aloni; with 
that· of the income tnx schedule and the capital lnbor ratio, inferences may be 
drawn about changes in the standard deviation of disposable income. For 
reasons of simplicity, the term capital refers in most cases only to land and 
human capital; however, in analyzing our final results, we do consider the 
effect of modifying the definition to include human capita~~ 
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The contributions of this paper are the following: 
(i) De consider income dispersion by household 
rather than by income classes. 
(ti) We make no restrictions on the precise form 
of the income distribution other than 
it possess finite first and second moments~ 
(iii) ~e are able to determine, under fairly 
~eneral conditions, the consumption optimal 
growth paths of the distribution of the 
capital labor ratio, the employment rate, GDP 
per laborer, and the standard deviation of 
dispos2.ble income per laborer. 
In section I, a static model is described, along with the effects of 
ch~nges in the standard deviation of the distribution of capital and the 
capital•labor ratio on re2l income and employment. In section II, this static 
formulation is incorporated into a dynamic optimi~ation model. Section III 
provides the derivation of first-order conditions and an appraisal of their 
policy implications. The l<'.st section discusses the e:~tension of the analysis. 
I. THE STATIC MODEL 
la Commodity demand functions and savings 
Denote consumption per laborer of the jth household by cj, capital per 
laborer by kj, and income per laborer (All variables are 
deflated by the commodity 1 price index.) Then the function determining the 
consumption• labor ratio of the j th household may be ,;,Jri tten ns 
(1.1) 
This function is consistent ·oith a number of theories of consumption behavior. 
If it is assumed that the ratio of real cash balances to capital assets re­
mains constant, then the relationship is similar to one proposed by Tobin [17] 
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which makes consu□ption proportionDl to real wealth. If, on the other hand, 
individual households s,we in order to maintain a fL,ed ratio of capital 
assets to normal income, then, ;iven no .'Jdjustment lag, a may be interpreted 
as the product of the reciprocal of this r.'Jtio and the marginal propensity 
to consume out of normal income. v!age income is untaxed and allocated 
completely to consump!:ion e~;:penditure. This assuu:ption may be easily relaxed 
without qualitatively affecting our results, provided that the tax rate on 
wage income is conste.nt. 
By subtractin~ consumption per laborer from tot,!l household income 
per laborer, 1•1e obtain the function 




~-- yt Q kj 
where sj is savings per 18'.,orer of the jth householci. and yj is disposable
D 
capital income per laborer of the jth household, (both deflated by the 
commodity 1 price inde2'.). Denote 2ggregate domestic st:vings per laborer by 
s, disposable capital income per laborer by y , Dnd capital intensity by k.
0 
Then taking the expected vc1lue of (1. 2) yields the aEgregate savings function 
(1. 3) s = Yn - a k 
For the sake of simplicity, net foreign capital inflm-1 (which may be easily 
incorporated by addin8 an intercept) is set equal to zero and the relationship 
(1.4) i = s 
where i is gross investment per laborer, is assumed to hold as an identity. 
We assume that there are two commodities, labelled 1 and 2. The impact 
of capital dispersion on economic variables in our t,w-zood model depends cri­
tically· on the form of the commodity demand functions. The function deter­
mining private consumption per laborer of commodity i mny be written as 
(1. 5) c. = c. (c, Ge' P)
1. 1. 
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where cr is the standard deviation of distribution of household consumption 
C 
per laborer, and Pis the ratio of the price of good 2 to the price of good 1. 
An exact derivation of this function exists in the case of a quadratic demand 
. 1
function. Suppose that the household demand function has the for~ 
(1. 6) 
where the j superscripts designate the value of consumption per laborer of 
the jth household. As Klein [ lL:-] has shown, takin:::, expected values of this 
expression yields 
(1. 7) 
By substitutin6 the expression for private consumption per laborer, 
into the commodity demand function, (1. 5) we obtain 
(1. 8) 
Consumption per laborer is a lineor function of ,;,J and k, and every household 
is assumed to face the same wage rate. Therefore, 0 may be obtained from 
C 
the variance-co-variance matri:.,~ of the bivariate distribution for the capital-
labor ratio and the emrloyLlent rate. In the case vJhere capital is defined 
to include human capital, the employment of particular household may well be 
an increasing function of its capital-labor ratio; s~illed laborers not only 
tend to get laid off after unskilled laborers but they are also in a position 
1The aggregate commodity demand function may also be derived from a 
household demand function o~ the for1'.1 li. ·q. 
c.J = A. (cJ) 1.c (P) 1.p 
l l. 
where the exponents represent partial elasticities, ,-ihich are assumed constant. 
In this case, the form of the distribution of expenditure per laborer must be 
restricted to be log normal. It can be shown that, under these assumptions, 
the function determinin3 the aggregate value of c may be written as 




µ = i1. (il. - 1) ( _s/
lC ' l.C C 
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to bump unskilled laborers. In this situation, ,-Je uould expect the variance 
of the employment rate to be increasinr; functions of the variance of capital. 
Clearly, the higher the a~gregate employment rate, the less significance 
this effect will have. 
With this reasoning in mind, the function for the standard deviation 
of private consumption per laborer can be written as 
(1. 9) o = </> (e, o)
C 
where c/l. < 0, ~- > 0 and ct, < O
0e ' Ge 
Throughout much of the subsequent analysis, howev8r, \·Je shall consider only 
the simple case vihere cc1pi tal does not include human capital and wage income 
per laborer is uniformally distributed. Since the expression for consumption 
per laborer is linear ink, we h~ve 
(1. 11) 
Under these conditions, the corn:r.odity c2cmand function may be viritten in the 
form 
(1. 11) C • = C • 11 ( ,., , k, p , 0) 
1. 1. 
Aggregate Output and Ernplovment 
The static part of the system is summarized by functions relating the 
aggregate employment rate and gross domestic product per laborer to the aggre­
gate capital-labor ratio and 2 measure of capital dispersion. These functions 
represent the reduced form solution of a general equilibrium trade model. 
In the version of the trade model presented here, two factors, capital 
and labor, are considered, as \vell as two commodities. It is assumed that the 
real wage expressed in terms of the labor intensive commodity remains constant 
at an exogenously-specified minimum and that the home country is incompletely 
apecialized. Brecher [3, pp. 32-5] has demonstrated that under these conditions, 
·\.,,:' I 
the home offer curve is of the st~aight-line Ricardian variety (in the region 
1
of incomplete specialization), This curve is represented by the line segment 
l\ A A u in Figure 1, ,-1hereas the foreign offer curve, which has a conven­
1 2 2 
tional shape, is represented by OF. The intersection at point S gives the 
equilibrium level of imports and exports< (Commodity 2 is assumed to be the 
exportable and commodity 1 the import-competing good.) The equilibrium produc­
tion point is shown tc, be point D in Figure 2, ,1hich is part of the straight­
line transformntion surface. With the real wcJge (expressed in terms of 
commodity 2) held fixed, ,-Je know by the Stolper··Samuelson theorem [ 18] that 
the slope of the commodity price line remaiPs constant, provided that there is 
incomplete specialization Th2 Engel curve corresponding to the constant 
commodity price ratio and " S')eci£ied "fllt:e for the standard deviation of the 
distribution of ~apital, a'; is depleted as r in Figure 2. (The derivation1 r 2 
of this curve from c:;;nmc,sity demand functions j_s discussed in the Appendix.) 
The offe~ trian~le DHd gi·Jing the equilibrium levels of imports and 
exports is constructed ±rorr, a price linr: p-p which intersects the transformation 
surface at the equilibrium production point, D, and the Engel curve at point d. 
The dimensions of this triangle corresponds to those of the triangle OSJ 
shown in the offer curve diagram (Figure 1). 
The rigid wage transformation surface, corresponding to the familiar 
Rybszynski line in trade theory, is made up of the locus of tangencies between 
the price line and the production possibility curves. 
2 
(The latter are based 
1See also Brecher [9, Part I, Section C]. 
2The production possibilities curves are based on the assumption that 
the sector i production function is of the form 
i 
:~ l =° F (K . , L . )1. 1. 
i > O TeiF F J • T > 0 
•'-. ~i1. 
where X. is output, K. i:: r.apital Dn<l L. is employed labor in sector i. These 
functio~s are presumeJ to be homcgenous1.of degree 1 is capital and labor and 
strictly quasi-concaves, For a cict[:iled derivation of the transformation sur­
face from the production possibility curves, see Brecher [3, pp. 6-30]. 
Figure 1 
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on the conventional 2ssumption of flexible factor prices.) Each production 
possibility curve corresponds to a different level of employment; the full 
employment curve is depicted by T T in Figure 2. Since commodity 2 is assumed1 2 
to have a lower capital-labor ratio than commodity 1 at all sets of factor 
prices, movements alon~ the transformation surface from R to R correspond1 2 
to increases in both employment and constant-price GDP. 
Now consider a decline in the standard deviation of the distribution 
of capital from cr• to cr". If we assume that the partial derivative of the 
1\,_Wit~- r:_spect,_t~~- . 
commodity 1 (2) demand funcl:i.on'v;1.s pos1.t1.ve (negative), then such an 
equalization of capital holdings will cause the Engel curve to shift to the 
left. The level of ,;.-,a::;e income consistent with a fixed level of commodity 1 
demand 'I.sill increase, ·uherc,ss the demand for commodity 2 will rise at all 
levels of wage income. If domestic production is held constant at point Don 
the transformation su:cface, the dimtnsions of the offer triangle will clrnnge 
from DHd to DZN in Fi,<;;ure 2. This change implies a reduction in the quantity 
of good 2 exports. Consequently, there will be.a dise~uilibrium in international 
markets, since the point on the home offer curve, s', corresponding to the 
new offer triangle, DZN, will not intersect the foreign offer curve in 
Figure 1. Brecher has sh01m that such an excess demand for an exportable 
which is relatively labor intense will be cleared by increased domestic pro­
duction of that commodity [ 3]. This takes the form of D leftward movement along 
the transformntion surface from D to a ne,,, equilibrium point D', implying an 
increase in both constant-price GDP nnd employment. 
By solving such a system we may derive expressions for GDP per laborer 
(y) and the ernployraent rate (e) ,,Jhich take the form 




k = capital-labor ratio 
a= standard deviation of the distribution of capital 
i-J = exogenously- specified real wage
2 
The partial derivatives of (1.12) are linear transforms of those of (1.13). 
Denote the real rental rate on capital (expressed in terms of commodity 1) 
by r • Then the expression for the value of GDP per laborer (expressed in
1 
1terms of commodity 1) may be written as. 
(1.14) y = wl e + rl k 
-where = pwl w2 
and prl = r2 
Since P and r are unL;uely determined by w (in the rer;ion of incomplete
2 2 
specialization), this is a linear function in e and k with constant coefficients. 
From this result, it follo,,s immediately that 
>
(L 15) a as o -< ooa 
and 
For this reason, the effect of changes in the standard deviation of 
the distribution of capital on the employment rate is_ of particular interest 
to us. This effect depends on the sign of the partial derivative of the de­
mand function for the import-competing good with respect to the standard 
deviation of the distribution of expenditure. In the Appendix, it is shown that 
in the region of incomplete specialization 
> oc1 < 
(1.16) g z as ~ > 0 
0- C 
1rt makes no difference which commodity price index is used to deflate 
GDP. Relative commodity prices are fixed, and the units of measurement may 
be chosen so as to make P equal unity without loss of generality. 
--------------
-13. 
That is to say, ¥educing (increasing) capital dispersion ,,ill cause the em­
ployment rate to increase (decrease) if and only if the aggregate demand for 
commodity 1 per laborer is an increasing (decreasin~) function of the standard 
deviation of expenditure per laborer. Recall the relationship between the 
aggregate (1. 7) and the household demand function (1. 6)" From this, it is 
clear that the qualitative effect of changes in capital dispersion on the 
employment rate is critically r~lated to the properties of the household demand 
functions for commodity 1. In particular when this function is quadratic, the 
sign of the partial derivative of the aggregate demand function with respect 
to CJ will be the same as the sign of the second partial derivative of the 
C 
household demand functic-::i for commodity 1 with respect to expenditure per 
laborer. 
The foreign exchange effec~ of a change in CJ is neutral in the sense 
that condition (1, l 'j) 'Uill hold even if the labor intensive good (commodity 2) 
is imported provided that the home country remains incompletely specialized. 
Under these conditions, the slope of the terms of trade line p-p in Figure 1 
jill not change; therefore, it is clear that the equilibrium exchange rate, 
1which represents che opp0rtuni ty co st of foreign e:-::chan6e ,~il 1 he constant. (The 
international price of the importable and the domestic price of the exportable 
are assumed to be fixed.) 
The social rate of retu=n on capital, fk' does not equal the private 
rate of return on capital, r -. An increase in k has a direct effect on y re­
1 
flected in r and an in<lirec~ 2ffect resulticg from its influence 6n the
1 
l This· 1.s· not ~.ru2 i'f t.h e ' come country is. comp 1ete1y specie. l'ized in. 
conunodity 1. In this case the foreign offer curve OFt intersects the domestic 
offer curve ,"lonG the segment u A in Figure 1, and movements in the home
1 1 offer curve induced by ch2nges 1.n O' will c1ffect the terms of trade. When an 
increase in a causes P to fall; as is the case ~,;hen the offer curve moves from 
u 1 A1
1 A ' UJ' ::o :J, ,; A the. wege r ~t_2 exp:'es sed in. terms of commodity 1
1 2 1 2 2will fall" Tiiese chaEges are associated w1.tL an increase 1.n employment and 
a decline in the ::: :;::o~·::,.mi ''=Y cost of fo~ei;n e::changeo 
- i4--
employment r.:,te. In the appendix, ue de:cive necessery and sufficient condi­
tions for 
which imply that 
(1. H,) fk > r l' fkk < 0, and f00 < 0 
A positive value for the Hessian determinant of (1.13), when combined with 
the above conditions on the second partials of this function, implies that 
(1.12) and (1. 13) are strictly concave,. Assumin;:; the household demand func­
tion has the quadratic form discussed earlier, the Hessian of (1.12) will 
always be positive if gklc and g are both negative. These conditions on00 
the second partials of (l,i3) require that the second expenditure partial of 
the household demand function for good 1, and hence oc /cP, be positive.1 
But, if this r2c;uirement is met., then by (L 16) 
(LE; g < 0 ---·---~ fa < 0..0 
Strict concavity not o:1ly confine:.:; us tc +:he case ,vhere equalization of capital 
holdings increases output and 1=mployment; it also violates a necessary condi­
tion for f (k,o) to hc2ve an interior 1uaximum. It is still, however, perfectly 
legitimate for us to consider E'. -:::o:-:n'"r maximum where condition (1.19) is met 
and CJ is determined by its lower boundo Consequently, our dynamic analysis 
will be confined to the case where~ and hence fa are negative for all 
feasible values of k and a. 
lL THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
Thus far, ,-Je have shown thr: direction of influence of k and CJ on GDP 
per laborer and the employment rate. Jut this analysis, pertaining only to 
a static situation does not provide insight into the mechanism by which 
changes in k and a ·:: al~e place ove;: time. More specifically, intemporal 
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relationships bet,,;,een these variables and the policy instruments designed to 
influence them remain to be formulated. 
The Dynamics 
The net change in the capital-labor ratio of the individual household 
is determined by its gross savin~ per laborer less the change in the capital 
·to; 
labor ratio due·: ·depreciation and population growth alone. Consequently, 
since household savin3 per laborer is given by (1.2) and fixed rates of 
depreciation and population growth are c:ssumed, ue may 1;.,rite 
(2. 1) i) = yj - ia ·, + n + 6 )kjD 
,-ihere kj is the time derivative of kj, . n is the r.ste of population 3rowth, and 
6 is the rate of depreciation. 
Denote taxes net of subsidies levied on the j-th household by NTjJ_ 





One possible tax function is 
(2. 4) NTj = a" + a" (yj - yk)
0 1 K 
which can be ·oritten as 
(2.5) NTj = a" + a" • r • (kj - k)
0 1 1 
The coefficient a" determines the revenue impact of the tax and the coefficient 
0 
ai determines the re-distributive effect of the tax. Substituting (2.5) 
into (2.3) yields 
(2. 6) 
8 II 




(2. 7) k~ E (kj) 
k ~ E (kj) 
and 
• 6 1 J. d J. 
(2. 9) CT = - E (k - k) • (k - k)CT dt 
we have 
(2. 10) k = rl (k -a 0 ) - (Ci + n + 6) k . 
(2. 11) CT = (1 - a ) CT - (CL+ n+ 0) CTrl 1 
We define the control variable u by the equation2 
(2, 12) 
The other control variable is given by the relationship 
a" 
0
(2 13) ½0 ao = ul = 
Note that u is only E. pseudo-·conti:-ol variable. In fact, it is the intercept
1 
of the net tax function (Le., , the expected net tm: ;;: 11 ) which the government
0 
controls, not its capitalized value-
The complete dynamics are then 
. 
(2. 14) k = r (k - u ) - (a + n + 6) k
l 1 . 
(2. 15) 0 = [rl u - (CL+ n + O)]CT2 
These differential equations are characterized by the lack of any assumption 
regarding the underlying distribution function beyond its having finite first 
and second moments. 
The form of equation (2.15) indicates that the time path of CT depends 
only on u • OtheL poiicies €ff2cting the employment rate (e.g., an export2 
subsidy) will not influence the time path of CT provided that the parameters of 
the net tax and savings functions ~re unchanged. At this point, it is impor­
tant to note that (2, lLi-) ,::nd (2. 15) are derived under the assumption of zero 
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marginal propensity to save out wage income, together with the uniform 
distribution of human capital (which is excluded from total capital). The 
• 
a equation is still valid under the assumption of a non-zero marginal propensity 
to save out of wage income, provided that this income is evenly distributed. 
Alternatively, we could assume that human capital is included in total capital 
and that wage income is unevenly distributed due to variation in the employ­
ment rate. Under these circumstances, it is legitimate to assume that the 
marginal propensity to save out of unskilled i-,age income is zero and equation 
(2.15) remains intact. (The effects of combining human and physical capital 
are considered in further detail in section III.) 
The Criterion Function 
Denote consumption (public and private) per laborer by c, and the total 
labor force by L. Instantaneous ,.elfare, u, is given by the function 
(2,lE,) U =Lu (c) 
The function u(c) cetermines ciggregate utility per laborer. Since the commodity 
price ratio is fixed, private consumption (expressed in terms of commodity 1) 
may be treated as a single iood. It is assumed that public and private con• 
sumption expenditure 2re perfect substitutes yielding identical marginal 
benefits to the households. 
The possible effects of changes in expenditure distribution on social 
welfare are not taken into account in this function. The inclusion of a 
C 
as well as c in the social ,,elfare function could be justified on the basis 
that the social welfare function represents an aggregation of individual 
utility functions. But this approach involves the usual pitfalls associated 
with cardinal utility and the assumption that utility is divisible [ 13]. 
-lE-
Further, a precise aggregztion of household utility functions would require 
that moments of the exper.diture distribution higher than the second be included 
1in the social welfare function. Finally, the only simple alternative to the 
utility aggregation approach··- a preference ordering for c and a obtained 
C 
by voting--seems to have equal, if not greater, defects [2]. 
The justification for the simple welfare function (2.16) goes beyond 
the fact that a more general function may be difficult to derive or analytically 
intractable. When concentrating on the efficiency aspects of capital and in­
come re-distribution, it seems reasonable to assume that distributional con­
2siderations by themselves do not influence social choice. 
The criterion fanl~tion itself may be written as 
T T 
( --
\ -y t ,,- -pt nt,,(2. I 7) u (c) dt = e Lo u(e) dt e \ e 
0 0 
where p is the rate of sociEl discount, n is the rate of population growth, 
Y is the discount rate net of population growth, Tis the planning horizon, 
and Lo is the initid labor force. Thus the paths of optimal capital accumula­
tion and distribution are given by the solutions of the following optimal 
control problem: 
(2. 18) U (c) dt 
0 
1The appearance of the second moment alone is justified only in the 
case where the household utility function is quadratic. Contrary to the 
assumptions of our model, the demand functions implied by such a utility 
function are linear in expenditure. 
2
In the special case \,here lump- sum transfers of consumer goods can 






(2.20) CT = [ r u - (Cl' + n + 6)] CT
1 2 
and the constraints 
(2.21) k > 0, CT _:: 0 
(r l - Cl) 
(2.22) 0 < u < k1-
(2. 23) 
\ The upper bound on u reflects the fact that gross investment per1 
laborer cannot be less than zero. The constraints on u2 indicate politically-
determined upper and lower bounds on the re-distribution coefficient of the 
tax function. 
Illa EQUILIBRIUM GRm-JTH PATHS 
The above optimal control problem is linear in the controls u and u ;1 2 
thus the optimal policies 1•Jill be of the "b~mg-singular-bang" type [5, pp. 261-65], 
i.e., the controls will move between their boundary values and an interior value 
(s) corresponding to the sinGular are (s). 
We shall consider only the case where for nll feasible values of k 
c1nd u 
since in the other cases the function f (k, O) is not concave. It will now 
be shown that this first partial derivative of this function with respect to 
O' will be negative in the case of a steady-state optimum only if o is equal 
to its lower bound. 
Suppose that an interior maximum exists. Denote the costate -,.,ariab les 
co;:-responding to k 2nd CT :)y :>..:c and ;\.CT respectively. Then, on the singular arc, 
~.hen Hu ~ G, the necessary condi tionslor optimc:lity are derived from a 
Hamiltonian of the form 
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(3. 1) H = e-vt [U (c) + A1_ i: + A,.,. a],\. V 
The form of this function indicates that the costate variables may be inter­
preted as the imputed values (shadm1 prices) of increases in k and O , measured 
in terms of utility. Froc (3.1), ~e derive 
(3. 2) H .
ul = 0 -. uC r 1 - rl )'!,;_ 








- rl + G') + Ak (r1 - Q' - n - () - y) 
(3. 5) -,, ( f: ) - \ (Cc+ n + () + Y)0 = Uc (5 0 
In addition, we have the dynamics ,,hich are given by equations (2.14) and. .
(2.15). In equilibrium, k =- 0 - Ak = I\. CJ = o. This gives 
I 1 ., ~G' + n + 0) i(3, 6) ul = I k 
;_ __ ~ rl 
and 
(3. 7) u = --
2 
Since r 
1 and o are positive, the shade,, price o:c o is given by -
(3. 8) \ = 0
0 
also, 
(3. 9) I\. = uk C 
The two remaining variab.les are k and o. These can be obtained from (3. ~-) 
and (3.5) giving 
(3~ 10) fk (k, cr) = n + o + y 
(3~ 11) fa (k, o) = 0 
As long as n and 6 are non-negative, the upper-bound on u
2 will not 
be exceeded at the equilibrium point. To insure that the lower-bound restric­
tion on u
1 
is met, the inequality 
r
1 
> n + 6 + Q' > 0 
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must hold. 1 This also implies that the steady-state equilibrium value of u2 
,·1ill be positive but less •:l1cm one. Such an intervd may ,,1~11 represent the 
limits of political accnptability. It means that the t2x will have some re­
distributive effect, but precludes an income-distribution reversal, (i.e., 
an inverse relationship bet,1een pre- t2.x and after-ta,~ income). Le c:ssurue 
th~t open unemployment e~ists 2long the optim2l tr2jectory; otherwise, (1.12) 
v,Ould be 2 discondnuo;_;s function.and thereby violc:;te the regul2rity cclld1tions 
of the optimal control probleLl, If the full-employment constraint is never 
binding, condition (3.10) will be met either if 
(a) commodity 2 is sufficiently inferior at the equilibrium 
point to make gk (k, cr) negative,·-
? 
oi if 
(b) the inequ2lity 
holds. Tbe l.Jtter condition implies that 
y > C' 
and that the net marginal product of capital in the pri­
vate sector (r 6) be less then the social rate of1 
-
d}_scount. -
Since condition ('.::. 1 :.) c.:nmot hold, .<:in interior maximum is impossible. 
This leaves us only 1-1ith a boundary maximum. It cDn be shown that as t 
approaches infinity, a vill approach its lower bound along the optimal trajec­
tory and k \·Ji 11 be determined oy the modified r:;ol den rule condition (]. 11 C). 
That there is an asymptotic turnpike associated with these values of k and a 
1A · . lnegative u1 may not 
'oe unrea1 . istic in. t12t it. means tath a steac
state optimum um be att.:iined only if there ore "forced savings." If the u,uuel
is modified to include positive net foreign capital inflmJ; the above condi­
tion is sufficient but not necessary for u
1 
to be non-negative.
2see appendix for the relationship between inferiority and the sign
of 3k (k, a). 
31eland [22] has shown that, with a certain type of risk aversion,
.there will be a precautionary demand for s2vings. His worl: indicates that it
is possible to hc]ve posit:i.ve savinss when the household, as t,ell as the social,
rate of time preference is less than the net private returns on capital.
Further, even after allm 1ing for a reasona'.Jle risL: premium, this return may be
high relative to the rate of time of preference of individuol foreigm lenders. 
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may Le demonstrated ~·.s follm-.1s. Note that the e,!uation determining CJ may be 
integrated directly as 
d,., 
~ = [ r u - u - u - O] dt 
CJ 1 2 
and r is assumed tote const2nt. Integration indicate that if CJ approaches
1 
zero, then u approaches nezative infinity provided that the time horizon is 2 
less than infinite. But Ur, is bounded from below by B. Therefore, a must 
L. 
approach zero asymptotically. 
By comparinz the asymptotic turnpike vc1lues of k and a with the initial 
conditions, the direction of change of these varia~les along the optimal tra­
jectory may be estnblished. Initial and steady- stnte optimal values of GDP 
per laborer and the ewployment rate may also be calculated from (3.10) 
and the lower bound on Q. As yet, however, we have not presented a method 
for deter □ inin; the standard deviation of the distribution of income. 
The standard de?iation of the distribution of disposable income per 
For,labbrer (O ) , in a stec1dy-- state equi librL.1m is a linear function of cr.
y 
from (L 25), we see that the total disposable income (,,,hich is the sum of 
income from capital y0
, and wage income w) is given by 
Total disposable income= r • k + w Expected net tax. 
Then, noting ::he fact that wage income per laborer is uniformally distributed, 
we see that 
0- 12) cr = (1 - a ) cr ry 1 1 
Then, from (3. 7) _, 
~3- 13) cr = (n + 6 + a) cry 
The directirJn o::: mover,1en..: of key <:arget varinbles in the model along 
the optimal trajectory is illustrated in Figure 3. Level curves are plotted 
representing the different combinations of k and a ,•ihich will yield the values 
of the employment rate, GDP per laborer, and tbe standard deviation of in-
t/ come per laborer existing Et the equilibri
um point Since the values of cr 
are plotted on the verticcil axis ,md the values of k on the horizontal axis, 
the curve corresponding to the equilibrium cr is a horizontal line vv' coin­y 
.. ciding with the horizontal axis,- (Here it is assumed that the lower bound 
for cry is zero.
) The curve corresponding the equilibrium value of GDP per 
laborer, yy:, ~learly has a steeper slope than the one corresponding to the
,
equilibrium employment rate, ~e·~. !.f the initial values of k and cr are in 
1The slope of the level curve for equilibrium GDP per laborer is 
given by the expression 
do/dk = ·· 
The absolute vabe of the right hacid side of this expression is greater than 
the ratio gk/ go. This ratio equals the ab solute value of the slope of the 
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region I, whicl, lies above the yy 1 curve, then both GDP per lc?borer and the 
employment rate will increase as the equilibriu2 point is approached. Initial 
values of k and o which lie bet\·Jeen the two curves in region II represent 
a case in which there is a decline in GDP per laborer and an increase in the 
employment rate alon8 the optimal trajectory. This is attributable to a de­
cline in the capital labor ratio which has a greater effect on GDP per laborer 
than it does on the employment rate. If the initial values of k and o lie 
in region III, then both GDP per laborer and the employment rate will decline 
along the optimal trajectory. 
DefininG capital to include human capital does not alter the qualita-
tive features of the optimd :::;rm-7th tr2jectory a great deal. Under these 
conditions, it is no lon~_er legitim2te to tissume thet a household's employment 
rate is independent of i~s car)ital-l2bor ratio. As 2lready noted in Section I, 
the variance and co-variance p&raraeters of the biv~ri2te distribution of 
the capital-laLo::.--rc.t:'..c-, .<,nd th: e,nployr:,ent rate depend on c· and e. 
and the same return on capital, the standard deviation of the distributionr 11 
of income per laborer is determined by the parameters of this distribution 
and ta • Consequently, o is an implicit function of0 and e, and we may write 2 y 
(3.14) oy = / (o, e, u2) 
In steady-state equilibrium we have 
(3. 15) a ;, r'J,, (a, e) 
y 
since u may be taken as a constant. Because the employment advantage of 
2 
a household with a high relative capital- labor ratio diminishes with an in-
crease in e, 
< 0 and ,J/a * > o. 1 e 
1For empiric2l evidence of an inverse relationship between income dis­
persion and the aggregate employment rate) see Schultz [21]. 
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Given that the first p2rti2ls of these functions have the s2me sign as those 
derived in Section I, for the case of incomplete specialization, then (3.15) 
may be written as 
(3. Hi) ay -- 't** (a, k) 
where 
Yi* > o 
CJ 
j"ki: < 0 
k 
The vv' curve in this case is shown in Figure 4. This curve is no 
longer perfectly horizontal, as it was in the . case ,-,here CJy depended on o 
alone. Instead, it now has a positive slope. If the initial values of k and o 
lie belm-J this curve, in re2;ion IV, the standard deviation_ of the distribution 
of income will increase don;; the optimc:il tr2jectory even though o declines. 
In all the other regions, ho~:ever, the dispersion measures ,,ill change in the 
same direction. 
IV. CONCLUSION::; 
In this paper, we have developed (1) a static model shmJing the re­
lationship between the distribution of the capital labor ratio, the aggregate 
employment rate and GDP per laborer; and (2) a system of dynamic equations 
determining the inter-temporal behavior of the capital distribution. Under 
certain conditions, we have derived the consumption optimal long run behavior 
of this distribution, the output and employment variables, and a measure of the 
dispersion of per-capita disposable income. In this section, we examine 
some of the implications of our results in greater detail. 
1. The optimal 6rm-1th problem is restricted to the good-things­
coming-together case ,-,here GDP per laborer and the employment rc1te 
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are decreasing functions of the standard deviation of the capital-labor 
ratio, a. Under i:hese conditions, a 2symptotically approaches its lower bound 
along the optimal trajectory. The optimal trajectories of k and a are uni­
quely-determined by the fir st- order condition only in this boundary-ma::imum 
situation. Nonetheless 7 it is still possible to examine alternative time 
paths even if output and employment are increasing functions (or independent) 
of a. While optimization presents difficulties in this case 7 we may deter­
mine the k and a trajectories as~oci:ated·.wiith given instrument paths, from 
the dynamic equations 7 (2.10) and (2.11). From these trajectories7 the effect 
of specified changes in the parameters of the net tax function on such target 
variables as the ~rr.ployme~1t ::::ate 1 income distribution and consumption may be 
analyzed. 
2. It may be argued that the objectives involving these variables 
ldll be achieved b; t:a:~es 2nd rubsidies on foreign trade as \•Jell as income 
taxation. 1 Assuming that t:he ~etzler paradox conditions do not hold, a tariff 
reduction (or export subsidy) will shift the offer curve to the left and increase 
the output share of the exportable commodity. See [3, Chapter 8] and [,:':, Part 4], 
With k and a conatant 7 this change will increase the employment rate and GDP 
(measured at constant domestic prices). However 7 even though commercial 
policy has the same effect on these variables as a change in 0 the impact on 
income distribution and GDP fl'!easured at ,-mrld prices may be considerably dif­
ferent. From (3.14) and (3.15); it is clear that a effects income distribution 
directly as well as through its influence on the employment rate. By contrast, 
tariff policy can decrease the standard deviation of the distribution of income 
1
Another possible c:lternative to income ta;rntion is the wage subsidy.However, given ::hat this is an effective policy instrument, it is not clearwhy open unemployment should exist at all. 
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only in the case where his p2rarneter depends on the er.1ployment rate, Othen-1ise, 
it has no effect. A tc::riff reduction (or export subsidy) unlike a change in 
a will ahiays cause the terms of trade to shift ai;,dnst the home country; 
hence, its effect on GDP measured at world prices is ambiguous. For these 
reasons a combination of capital re-distribution and tariff policies may be 
warranted when the employment rate is a decreasing function of a. In this 
case, it may be desirable to improve the terms of trade short of the st8ndard 
optimal tariff point or at least use tariff policy to prevent highly adverse 
terms of trade change. 
l 
The resulting decline or 12d: of grmvth in employment 
could be offset by increc:sin:3 the re·-distribution coefficient of the income 
tax function and there;:iy dec::,:-easing G, Of course, if the employment rate 
is an increasing fucction of c, alterations in the distribution of capital per 
laborer cannot be used to increase the flexibility of tariff policy, without 
conflicting withe goal of zreater equity. 
3. Our model mr.y be e8sily modified to include the effects of once­
and- for-all chan6es in production function parameters. These changes are parti• 
cularly important in the c~se i;Jhere the lower bound on o is positive 
due, say, to some persons 0eing uneducable. Under these conditions, the para­
meter variations ,-1ill have a si3nificant impact on the long-run optimal income 
distribution. This impact may well be considerably different from that obtained 
by comparative static analysis ,-lith k and a constant. For example, such 
analysis indicates that, under certain conditions, a Hicks-neutral productivity 
1standard optimal tariff theory, e.g., Kemp [12, pp. 296-363], is 
not applieble, in this case since it is based on the cssumption of full em­
ployment. 
increase in the cDpital-intensive sector will c2use the employment rate to 
decline [3, chapter VI]. Gi'1en (3.IL:-), this implies a more uneven distrfoution 
of income. On the other hand, the asymptotic turnpi~e values of these 
variables may change in the opposite direction if the increase in produc­




P = the ratio of the price of commodity 2 to the price of commodity 1. 
H. = the real uage (expressed in terms of commodity i) 
1. 
r. = rent2l r.c!te on cnpital (expressed in terms of coranodity i)
1. 
w = wnge income per lc1borer expressed in terms of comrr,odi ty 1. 
e = the employment rate 
k = the capital labor ratio 
a = the stand2rd deviation 0£ the capital lnoor ratio 
'propensi~) 
Mlc = the mar2;inal\to consume commodity 1 out of total expenditure. 
Ble = the first comraodi~y 1 s share in the general expansion of output 
due solely to c.::1 i~crease in the employment rate 
Blk == the first commodity's shDrE: in the gener.::il expansion of output 
due sa:el; to ~n incrense in the capit2l labor ratio 
1-1 = th(; second p2rticJ. deri·:2tive of t1.1e cor..r.1odity l de'.Tland function 
lee 
witL respect tc pri·,ate consutTption IJccr laborer. 
Mlcm = the secoad par ti cl derivative of the commodity 1 demand function 
with respect to a 
= the cross partinl derivative of the ccrnrnodity 1 demand function 
with respect to c and cr. 
L = the specified labor force in the home country 
L* = th~ specified labor force in the rest of the world. 
Final demand per laborer is equal to the sum of private consumption 
(c), public consumption (g), and private investment (i) per laborer. Since 
1
the latter two components are assumed ~o affect only commodity 1, and the 
relationship 
1This assumption ~ay be relnxed. Alloc2ting 2 fixed proportion of 
(g + i) to a non-trnded ~oods sector (including construction and government 
services) will n~t ch~nge our quElit2tive results. 
(A,l) 
holds, the functions deterr.1ining final demand per laborer in the two sectors 
may be written in the form 
(A.2) y = C " (k (J
1 1 ' ' 
=c " (k CJ w p)Y2 2 ' ' ' 
Sectoral final demands per laborer aTe implicit function of the employment 
/\ 
rate, since w is given by 
(A.4) 
With p, k, and~ held constant, y is uniquely determined by y through the1 2 
employment rate variaLle; l1ence, the modified Engel curve, shown in Figure 2 
of the text, mc1y be dE:rived,. 
Recall tha-:: :ommodity 1 is ,_ssumed to be the import-competing good. 
The output of this csmmcdity per l::il)orer, x
1
, depends on the commodity price 
ratio, the employm-.::.nt rc1te:, 1:1.n-i --~.he -:.:1pit2l .. labor rc:tio, Net imports of 
commodity 1 per laLorer: z
1
, are given by the expTession 
(A. S) - C II 
1 
By substituting the expression for w int0 this relationship, we obtain 
The balance of payments condition may be written as 
(A.7) 
where the function z/< (p) determines the rest of the ,vorld' s net imports of 
1commodity 2 per laborer. 
1 ·. his genera!_)
This formulation is 2 simple extension of Kemp I s [ 12, chapter--Z.]ancf\ -
approach. to comparative static analysis applies here. We have retained his 
assumptions and notation as much as possible. 
It can be shown that the endogenous variables in this equation will be un-
affected by labor force grouth, provided that the ratio of L* to L remains 
fi;ced. 
By differenti2tin3 this e2:pression totally, ·iie obt.2in expressions 





where z = r 
1 
Consequently, provided thc::t the margin2l propensity to consume comrrodity 1 
out of total expendituye i'ilc' is non-negative ,:,;it less than unity, the par­
tial derivative of the e,,1ployment rate ,vith respect to the capital-labor 
1
ratio (oe/ok) will be positive. Moreover, given this type of non-inferiority, 
since (Hl c - B ) is ne._,1Jtive.
le 
The higher order p.::rtid derivE.tives take the :form 
-[(/M !j w a M r (z - B k)]
(A. 1 O) lee - 1 lee 1 1 







2/- e - [M1oa 6 - wl (Ml cC) i·\a l(A.12) 
= 
-- 2 "2::50 Ll 
If the household demand function is auadratic in expenditure, the cross 
partial derivative 1-1 uill be zero. See (l.G). This implies that the
1ca 
? 
cross partial derivative a~e/ak ao ~ill be zero. Conse~uently, if the co-
efficient for squared e~:pendi ture in the household demccnd function is positive, 
1rt can be shmm that ;:. in equ2tion (A. G) is less than one if and only 
if Mlc is less than one, and Kem~ [12, p. 110] has pro~en that 
B, _ > 1 £1nd B < C • 
... l~ 1e 
uhen commodity 1 is rel<"ti·;ely capital intensive. 
then the Hessian for the function determining the employment rate will t>e 
negative definite. The second partials M and M ,...,~ ~ill both be positive ....lee 1vv 
and therefore 
2





) > 0 
will hold. 
These conditions ,-1il 1 not hold at a point where 
(A, 15) oe/ocr = o and M = o10 
In the case of the quadratic demand function described, such zero partials 
imply 
At this point, the value of cr ,-1hich maximizes the employment rate is not 
unique, since the Hessian vanishes when the first-order condition (A.15) 
is met. 
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